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Abstract: In the context of integrated transportation and other urban engineering infrastructure systems, there are many examples of mar-
kets, where consumers exhibit price-taking behavior. While this behavior is ubiquitous, the underlying mechanism can be captured in a single 
framework. Here, we present a microsimulation framework of a price-taker market that recognizes this generality and develop efficient algo-
rithms for the associated market-clearing problem. By abstracting the problem as a specific graph theoretic problem (i.e., maximum weighted 
bipartite graph), we are first able to exploit algorithms that are developed in graph theory. We then explore their appropriateness in terms of 
large-scale integrated urban microsimulations. Based on this, we further develop a generic and efficient clearing algorithm that takes advan-
tage of the features specific to urban price-taker markets. This clearing solution is then used to operationalize two price-taker markets, from 
two different contexts, within a microsimulation of urban systems. The initial validation of results against the observed data generally shows 
a close match.   
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1 Introduction
The importance of microsimulation as a framework, to analyze 
integrated urban infrastructure systems, has been emphasized 
in recent integrated transportation and land-use modeling lit-
erature (Wegner, 1995; Miller and Roorda, 2003; Miller, 2008; 
Hunt, Kriger, and Miller, 2005). Microsimulation provides a 
comprehensive and flexible framework for modeling the be-
havior of individual agents as well as representing the various 
processes that drive urban evolution (Orcutt, 1957, 1990). In 
the microsimulation of urban systems, two important dimen-
sions to capture are the decision making of individual agents 
(or groups of agents1), and their interactions with other agents 
in the markets. In the past 40 years, modeling and analysis of 
decision making (e.g., households and firms’ location, mode, 
and vehicle choice decisions, etc.) in the urban context have 
received considerable importance from economics, transpor-
tation, environment, energy, real estate, and urban planning 
literature. However, the modeling of inter-agent interactions 
within urban markets (e.g., housing, freight, airline seats auc-
tions, etc.) remains relatively unexplored (Miller et al., 2004; 
Zhang and Levinson, 2004).
 Farooq (2011) conceptualized urban markets as the 
encapsulation of interactions between seller/producer and 
buyer/consumer agents that result in the exchange of a service/
good and a monetary transaction. The goal of both buyers and 
sellers within this interaction is to achieve some desirable gain 
in terms of their profit/utility. Based on how the monetary 
value is formulated in this interaction, these markets can be 
categorized as either price-taker or price-formation markets. In 
both price-taker and price-formation markets there exist pro-
ducer/seller and consumer/buyer agents that are profit/utility 
maximizers with varying levels of information about the mar-
ket. Producers list their good at a certain asking price in the 
market. Consumers form their choice sets from the available 
options in the market. In the price-taker case consumers are as-
sumed to accept the asking price as it is and determine the gain 
in their utility/profit at that price. By comparing the relative 
gains among the choices available, a consumer may decide on 
choosing one option. In terms of microsimulation, the model-
ing of a price-taker market-clearing problem thus becomes a 
matching problem in which the modeler is interested in find-
ing out “who gets what.”  The price determination and choice 
set formation models are exogenous to the clearing process. At 
a given exogenously determined price surface for the stock and 
choice sets of the buyer agents, the sequence of individual level 
clearing in the market thus guides the matching process.
 This can be contrasted with price-formation mar-
kets, in which prices do not remain fixed during the clearing 
process but rather are determined within the market-clearing 
process. In terms of microsimulation, the modeling of a price-
formation market-clearing problem is a matching problem in 
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which the modeler is interested in finding out “who gets what 
at what price.” Examples of classic approaches that used mar-
ket equilibrium to formulate prices are Alonso (1964), Putman 
(1983), Echenique et al. (1990), Martinez (1992), Anas and 
Arnott (1993), (1994), and de la Barra (1995). Farooq (2011) 
proposed a disequilibrium-based comprehensive microsimula-
tion framework for modeling urban price-formation markets 
and operationalized it for the owner-occupied housing market 
in the greater Toronto and Hamilton area (GTHA) within the 
ILUTE (Miller et al., 2011) modeling system. Other examples 
of operational urban price-formation markets can be found in 
Waddell et al. (2003), Ettema et al. (2007), and Devisch et al. 
(2009). 
 The focus of this paper is the urban price-taker mar-
ket. Here we present a generalized clearing framework devel-
oped for urban price-taker markets by reducing the clearing 
problem of the market to a graph theoretic problem. Such a 
market is represented as a bipartite graph in which consumers 
and products/producers are the vertices of the two sides; choice 
sets are the edges; and the unidirectional/bidirectional prefer-
ences are the weights on the edges. By doing so, the algorithms 
developed for finding the solution for the maximum weighted 
bipartite matching problem are directly used to find the clear-
ing solution for the urban price-taker markets. The generalized 
nature of the formulation ensures that the proposed mecha-
nism can be used for clearing various urban markets that come 
under the category of price-taker market. The market-clearing 
problem discussed here is equivalent to an assignment problem, 
which is a special case of a class of linear programming prob-
lems called the transportation problem. To find a solution for 
an assignment problem, the predominantly used algorithm for 
transportation problems, called transportation simplex, is in-
efficient (Winston, 1991). Thus, in the literature, alternative 
approaches are developed to find the solution for assignment 
problems. As an initial exploration, here we first employ the 
most commonly used algorithm of such category in order to 
explore various features and appropriateness of these graph 
theoretic algorithms in the context of large-scale integrated ur-
ban microsimulations. Based on this analysis we then develop 
an algorithm for optimum allocation under the computational 
and memory constraints that could arise due to the very large 
size of the market in the microsimulation of urban systems.
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 lists the model’s assumptions, introduces the market model 
structure, clearing problem, and develops the methodology for 
finding the clearing solution. Section 3 then presents our pro-
posed solution, which adopts a probabilistic individual utility 
maximization approach. In Section 4, we present the applica-
tion of the proposed framework to two important urban mar-
kets. In the last section, we present our concluding remarks and 
future directions of the research.
2 Price-taker markets: model structure
2.1 Key assumptions and definitions
There are two types of agents in the market: consumer agents 
(persons, households, firms, etc.) and producer agents (per-
sons, households, airlines, builders, landlords, etc.). The as-
sumptions concerning each of these agents are listed below.
Generic assumptions:
	 • Agents maximize their individual profit/utility.
	 •	Agents are noncooperative with varying degrees of 
 information about the market.
	 •	The market perceptions (information) of agents ar 
 updated as they spend more time in the market.
	 •	Agents have the option to stay or leave the market at 
 any time.
	 •	The utility function for both consumer and producer
 agents are exogenously defined.
Consumer assumptions:
	 •	Each consumer is looking for a single unit of good 
 to purchase/lease.
	 •	 There is an exogenous mechanism that generates a 
 choice set for each consumer. This process models the 
 choice set generation process of the consumer. The choice 
 sets generated by this process for all consumers will then 
 be used by the clearing mechanism. There may be an 
 indirect interaction between market clearing and the 
 choice set generation process. For instance, the shortage 
 of a certain type of good in the short-term, which resulted 
 from faster clearing, could cause the choice set generation 
 mechanism to adjust the choice set of the active 
 consumers based on their reaction.
	 •	 Due to changing market perceptions, buyers may 
 update their choice sets over time.
	 •		The differences among the behavior of consumers are
 captured in the utility function and the choice set 
 generation mechanism.
Producer assumptions:
	 •	Each producer is offering a single unit of good for 
 sale/lease.
	 •	Due to changing market perceptions, producers may 
 adjust their valuation of a good.
Definitions:
Vertex [v in set V]: an object that may represent certain real life 
entity (i.e., person or household)
Edge [e in set E]: connects one vertex to another. It may convey 
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the relationship between the two vertices that it connects to-
gether (i.e., two persons connected by a sibling edge)
Weight of an edge [w in set W]: It is an integer or a real value as-
sociated with an edge. It may convey the intensity of a relation-
ship between the two vertices the edge is connecting
Association of an edge: It is the set of two vertices that an edge 
is connected to
Graph [G = (V; E, W)]: It is an ordered pair consisting of a set 
of vertices V connected by edges from set E having weights 
from set W
Adjacent vertices (vi, vj): Two vertices vi and vj in a graph that are 
directly connected by an edge (eij) of the same graph
Cardinality: Number of elements in the set. If A= { a, b, c, d}, 
then the cardinality |A| is 4
Disjoint sets: Sets in which the intersection is the empty set. 
There is no common element between the disjoint sets. If  A = 
{ a, b, c ,d } and B = { f, g, } then set A and B are disjoint
2.2 Model structure
Suppose that in a price-taker market there are N consumers 
interested in buying/leasing a differentiated good offered by M 
producers, who are offering one good each. Before making a 
selection, consumers generate a list of goods (i.e., choice set) 
that are of interest. They establish preferences for each good 
within their choice set, based on their consumption behavior 
and the attributes of the goods. Producers may also assign a 
value to the good that influences their preferences for each con-
sumer. If the choice set and individual degree of preferences for 
all consumers/producers are known, we can express the market 
in the form of a bipartite graph (G). A bipartite graph is a type 
of graph that has two disjoint vertex sets, such that no two 
vertices in the same set are adjacent (Wilson, 1979; Gondran 
and Minoux, 1984; and Cormen et al., 2001). Let the graph 
in Figure 1 be represented by G = (C, P; E), where C and P are 
the two disjoint sets and E ⊆ C x P  represents the set of edges 
between the vertices of the two sets. Note that the intersection 
of sets C and P is a null set and the cardinality of their union is 
the sum of their individual cardinalities. Also, if E1 ⊂ E is a set 
of edges strictly between vertices in set C and E2 ⊂ E is a set of 
edges strictly between vertices in set P, then the cardinality of 
both E1 and E2 and  is strictly zero. An alternate way of defining 
this property is that every edge in set E is associated with one 
and only one vertex from each of the two disjoint vertex sets 
(C and P).
Figure 1. A bipartite graph G = (C, P; E)
 In Figure 1, let set C represent the list of consumers 
and let set P represent the list of producers in the market. The 
preferences between C and P are represented by the edges be-
tween them, which belong to set E with the weights on each 
edge representing the individual degree of preference. These 
edges can be unidirectional or bidirectional. The unidirec-
tional edges represent the case where only consumers gener-
ate a choice set and assign a certain degree of preference to 
each choice. An example of such a case is the rental housing 
market where the renters look at the available options in the 
market and form their choice sets and preferences. In the case 
of bidirectional edges, the mutual preferences are formed as a 
function of the individual preferences of both consumers and 
producers to each other. An example of this would be potential 
couples who are matched in an abstract process that we define 
as a “marriage market.” Both rental and marriage markets are 
discussed in more detail in Section 4.
2.3 Price-taker market clearing as a matching prob-
lem of a bipartite graph
The clearing problem for an urban price-taker market requires 
using the available choice sets and the degrees of preferences to 
determine the one-to-one matching between consumers and 
producers. This matching problem, under the graph abstrac-
tion of the market defined in the previous section, can be re-
stated as a problem of finding the maximum weighted bipartite 
matching. This approach provides the “best” possible matches 
that can be made for the market at hand. Suppose that for ev-
ery edge e in set E, there is an associated weight w in set W: C 
x P → ℝ then G = (C, P; E, W), and the problem of finding 
maximum weighted bipartite matching can be defined as find-
ing a graph G* = (C, P; E*, W*) such that the cardinality of E* 
equals cardinality of C and P. Every vertex in set C is connected 
to one and only one vertex in set P by an edge in E,* and there is 
no more than one edge associated with each vertex. Moreover, 
there doesn’t exist a graph G** = (C, P; E**, W**) such that the 
sum of weights in W** is greater than the sum of weights in W* 
i.e., ΣcєC W*(c,e(c)) ≥ ΣcєC W**(c,e(c)), where e:C → P.
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 In the graph theory literature, the problem of maxi-
mum weighted matching or assignment has extensively been 
studied and various efficient algorithms have been developed 
for this purpose. The problem has proven to be a special case 
of the minimum cost-flow problem, and thus can be solved 
using linear programming algorithms (Burkard et. al., 2009). 
Hungarian algorithm is the most commonly used solution for 
the assignment problem and various variants of it are proposed 
in the literature. In ILUTE, we first used one such modified 
version of the Hungarian algorithm in order to implement the 
clearing process for the urban price-taker market.
3 Price-taker markets: clearing solutions
3.1 Hungarian algorithm
Kuhn (1955) used the König’s matching theorem (König, 
1931) and Egerváry’s generalization of it to the weighted bi-
partite case (Egerváry, 1931) in order to derive the Hungarian 
algorithm for finding the maximum weight perfect matching 
in a bipartite graph (Frank, 2004). The Hungarian algorithm 
is based on a linear programming approach that involves trans-
forming the problem into a combinatorial optimization prob-
lem. Suppose the graph G = (C, P; E, W) in Figure 2a is repre-
sented by M, which is a  n x m matrix. The rows in matrix M 
represent set C and its columns represent the set P. The value 
of each cell represents the weight of the edge between vertices. 
If there is no edge between the two pair of vertices, then the 
cell value is blank. 
The steps of Hungarian algorithms are as follows2 (Winston, 
1991).
 Step 0: Transform the problem into a minimization
 problem.
 Step 1: For each row, subtract the minimum cell value
 from rest of the cells. Each row will have at least one
 zero and all the values will be greater than or equal 
 to zero.
 Step 2: For each column, subtract the minimum cell 
 value from the rest of the cells. Each row and column 
 will have thus at least one zero.
 Step 3: Go through the rows and columns and use 
 lines to cover the zeros in the matrix in such a way that 
 all the zeros are covered and that no more lines have 
 been drawn than necessary. Use a horizontal line for 
 rows and a vertical line for columns.
 Step 4: Optimality test:
 If the count of the lines is, choose a combination from
 the modified matrix in such a way that the sum is zero
 If the number of the lines is less than, go to Step 5.
 Step 5: Find the smallest element that is not covered 
 by any of the lines. Then subtract it from each entry 
 that is not covered by the lines and add it to each 
 entry that is covered by both a vertical and a 
 horizontal line. Go back to Step 3.
a. G = (C, P; E, W)  b. G* = (C, P; E*, W*)
Figure 2. Weighted bipartite graph
Note that Kuhn (1955) designed the algorithm for the case of a 
square matrix, but in the implementation of urban price-taker 
markets, this is rarely the case. A typical example is the rental 
housing market, where there can be more households than the 
number of dwellings available for rent (i.e., rows > columns). 
In that case, the rectangular matrix is padded with zero value 
columns so that it becomes a square matrix. This way, our solu-
tion will allow for consumer/producers not being able to buy/
sell their good at the end of the clearing process. The original 
Hungarian algorithm proposed by Kuhn (1955) has a time 
complexity of 0(|E||C||P|)3.  In the worst case () the complex-
ity becomes a polynomial of order 4. Tomizawa (1971) pro-
posed some modifications to the original algorithm to reduce 
the complexity to a polynomial of order three. In the current 
implementation of ILUTE, we implemented the version pro-
posed by Tomizawa. 
3.2 Issues with a system optimal solutions
Winston (1991) showed that the solution computed by the 
Hungarian algorithm would provide the optimal solution to 
assignment type problems. This implies that a market-clear-
ing solution that employs the Hungarian algorithm presents a 
system optimal solution, where the maximum sum of profits/
utilities is obtained given a certain market. However, system 
optimal conditions may not be the best way to represent true 
urban market conditions, as can be observed in the case of user 
vs. system optimal flows in transportation networks or in mod-
eling the marriages within a demographic update module of 
an agent-based urban modeling system. Both consumers and 
producers are not expected to sacrifice their individual prof-
its/utilities to improve society’s overall utility. If that were the 
case, drivers would use longer individual routes just to keep 
2 It is interesting to note that the original algorithm was proposed at the time when computers were not widely in use. It was thus designed for the matrix to be 
solved on a piece of paper.
3 Time complexity O() of an algorithm explains how its computational time will respond to the change in the size input (Cormen et al., 2001). Hungarian algo-
rithm’s computational time is a product function of the number of edges and total vertices.
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the system level travel time low. Or brides and grooms might 
not marry their true love for the sake of the greater good of the 
society!
 Furthermore, a deterministic system optimal solution 
leaves out the impact of uncertainty on the urban price-taker 
markets. Arguably, this stochasticity is an important driver for 
these markets’ results. A landlord seeking to rent out an apart-
ment will not wait until he or she has surveyed all possible 
tenants. Often instead the landlord settles on one of the first 
tenants that meets his or her asking price. In a similar vein, 
people who get married forgo the possibility of finding a bet-
ter match had they remained single. Clearly, these two simple 
examples illustrate that the rather strong assumptions with a 
deterministic system optimal solution fail to capture important 
features of urban price-taker markets.
 Finally, another shortcoming of the Hungarian algo-
rithm for this application is the computational and memory 
size requirements that come from manipulating large matri-
ces involved in the algorithm (i.e., operationalization for very 
large-scale markets). Gillett (1976) and Winston (1991) 
reported that in large-scale assignment problems, finding 
the minimum number of lines in the serial version of the 
Hungarian algorithm might not be computationally cost ef-
fective.
3.3 A probabilistic approach
To deal with these issues in the serial implementation, we 
propose a probabilistic approach that relaxes the assumptions 
made regarding the maximization of the market’s overall utility 
by introducing some stochasticity in the approach. Our pro-
posed method is more representative of real life markets and 
is less burdensome with respect to computational time and 
memory requirements as well. 
The simple algorithm for finding G* = (C, P; E*, W*) is as fol-
lows:
 Step 1: With a predefined random distribution, pick 
 between set C or P 4
 Step 2: From the selected set, choose a vertex v1 using 
 another predefined random distribution
 Step 3: For v1 choose v2 such that w12 ≥ w1i   V → v1, 
 where V is the set that was not chosen in Step 1
 Step 4: Remove v1 and v2 and all the edges associated
 with them
 Step 5: Stop if either C or P becomes a null set. Other
 wise, go to Step 1
 The probabilistic approach reduces the complexity 
of the matching processes to 0(max(|C|, |P|)). Note that this 
algorithm results in linear complexity compared to cubic in the 
case of the Hungarian algorithm. Moreover, it is not depen-
dent on the number of edges and thus reduces the variability 
between the worst and best cases. The probabilistic approach 
does not guarantee perfect matching, but gives us an adequate 
solution that respects both individual profit/utility maximiza-
tion and uncertainty. This approach is more representative of 
the real price-taker markets in transportation, where due to 
the sequence of events and the limited amount of information 
available to the agents, the clearing of a market doesn’t always 
result in a perfect matching. 
4 Applications
4.1 Price-taker markets in ILUTE
In the urban systems modeling and microsimulation research, 
many urban markets can be expressed as the price-taker market 
formulation introduced in Section 2. A few examples of such 
markets include: labor, rental housing, airline seat auctions, bus 
routes, and spot-freight markets. Here we present the opera-
tionalization of two very important markets within ILUTE, 
using the price-taker market formulation.
 The microsimulation modeling of activity-based 
travel demand and land-use evolution requires maintaining 
the socioeconomic characteristics of individual decision mak-
ers throughout the simulation horizon. This can be achieved 
through the implementation of a sophisticated demographic 
update mechanism within these systems. In ILUTE, the de-
mographic update involves various processes that deal with a 
person’s birth, education level, driving license, aging, death, 
marriage, divorce, and migration—the details of which can be 
found in Miller et al. (2008).
4.2 Marriage market model
For this paper, the process of managing agents’ marriages in 
the simulation is of particular interest. In terms of the imple-
mentation of this process in a microsimulation framework, 
marriages can be abstracted as a market-clearing problem in 
which currently single males and females are to be matched ac-
cording to their mutual preferences. To achieve that, we reduce 
the process to a price-taker market formulation, which we call 
a marriage market. This market matches prospective husbands 
and wives together within a utility maximization framework. 
 At each time step in the ILUTE microsimulation, the 
decision of whether to look for a potential marital partner for 
all adults is first evaluated. This results in two pools of single 
men and single women. The marriage process then determines 
the choice set for every individual using predefined search 
4 Examples: predefined random distribution can be uniform (0.5, 0.5) such that both sets have equal probability of being chosen, or it can be restricted to choosing 
from only one set by setting the probability of selection to 1.
46 JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT AND LAND USE 6.1
criteria (e.g., spatial proximity, age difference, etc.). The ran-
dom utility-based model that was estimated by Choo et al. 
(2008) was adapted for ILUTE and is used to compute the 
utility of each potential couple. These utilities are based on the 
potential couple’s income(s), education, and the male/female 
ratios in their respective geographic areas.
 The two pools of males and females that are active in 
the marriage market here can be represented by the set C and 
P of the bipartite graph formulated in Section 2. A node in 
set C can represent a male in the pool of potential husbands, 
and a node in set P can represent a female in the pool of po-
tential wives. The choice sets of all the individuals active in the 
marriage market can be expressed by the edges between sets 
C and P, while the mutual utility is represented by the weight 
on the edges between the sets’ elements (i.e., the potential 
couple). This reduces the marriage market to the price-taker 
formulation suggested in Section 2. Moreover, the clearing of 
the marriage market then becomes equivalent to the problem 
of finding the maximum bipartite graph under the conditions 
defined in Section 2. Note that the edges in the case of the mar-
riage market are bidirectional, which represents the fact that 
the weight on each edge is a function of the utilities of both the 
potential bride and the groom.
4.3  Marriage market operationalization within ILUTE
In the current version of ILUTE (ILUTE v1.0, which is in de-
velopment), a generic class called the StaticMarket (Figure 3) is 
implemented as a super class representing the price-taker mar-
kets. This class encapsulates all the generic features of such a 
market, and it is based on the theoretical framework described 
in Section 2. The two clearing algorithms discussed in this 
paper, are at the moment, implemented in two separate ver-
sions of the StaticMarket. However, we intend to merge them 
into a single class that provides the option for the children of 
this class to select the exact clearing process. Various realiza-
tions of price-taker markets, including the MarriageMarket and 
RentalMarket, are then inherited from the StaticMarket and 
implement the specific features required by the markets they 
represent.
Figure 3. Class structure of price-taker markets within ILUTE
Figure 4 displays a sample relational class diagram for the 
StaticMarket superclass and the markets it represents. The su-
perclass contains bidder and good objects that correspond to 
both sides of a market, as well as the necessary engines for mar-











Figure 4. Sample relational class diagram
4.4 Marriage market simulation results
This subsection presents results from the implementation of 
the MarriageMarket in the ILUTE model system. We simu-
lated an initial population representative of the GTHA for a 
period of 15 years (1986–2001). Figure 5 shows the age distri-
bution of married people in ILUTE as compared to a represen-
tative dataset for the GTHA in 2001. For the most part, the 
age distribution of married persons is reproduced fairly well. In 
addition to maintaining the marital age distribution through-
out the simulation, it is also important to correctly model the 
age people decide to get married. Table 1 then shows the mean 
age of brides and grooms in ILUTE along with comparable 
historical data. The results are very strong for simulating the 
mean marrying age of single and divorced individuals. How-
ever, there is some divergence for the widowed class, which is 
not unreasonable due to the smaller market share of widowed 
persons and the results’ inherent dependency on simulating 
deaths.
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Figure 5. Comparison of results for age distribution of married indi-
viduals, between ILUTE and the Survey of Household Spending (SHS) 
for year 2001
Table 1. Average age by previous marital status of the newly married 
individuals in (2001)
Average Age of 
Newlyweds
Statistics 
Canada ILUTE % Error
Groom
Single 29.7 29.1 -2.1
Widowed 62.4 50.9 -22.6
Divorced 43.8 44.2 0.9
Brides
Single 27.6 27.3 -1.1
Widowed 55.4 47.5 -16.6
Divorced 40.3 41.7 3.4
Expanding on the results from Table 1, the marriage rates by 
age group (i.e., number of marrying persons divided by the size 
of the age group) for males and females are displayed in Figure 
6. While the general trend is captured by the model, ILUTE 
shows systematically higher marriage rates than the census data.
Figure 6. ILUTE and census marriage rates by age group (2001)
 The previous results have centered on the decision to 
join the MarriageMarket. The next results now focus on how 
well the ILUTE MarriageMarket matches potential couples. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of newly wedded couples by age 
group. Again, the general trend is captured by the Marriage-
Market, with the majority of newly married persons being un-
der age 35. Note that historical GTHA values were not avail-
able, so national (i.e., Canadian) values were used as proxies. 
Besides age, income differences were used to pair up possible 
marriage matches. Figure 7 shows the distribution of income 
differences for married couples in the ILUTE simulation in 
2001. These results display a strong performance in compari-
son to census values.
Table 2. Distribution of newly married couples by age group (2001)
Figure 7. Distribution of income differences (2001)
4.5 Rental housing market
Another important application of urban price-taker markets 
is the market for rental housing. Housing (rental and owner-
occupied) market models are important in the context of ur-
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ban microsimulation because they influence the spatial and 
temporal distributions of the population in the region. The 
two markets could have different dynamics due to regional 
economics, supply, space-time, and socio-demographic condi-
tions, but the two markets influence each other through agent 
interactions and lagged signals. Conditions in both the rental 
and owner-occupied housing markets play key roles in the 
location decisions of the households. Both market types are 
separately implemented in the current version of ILUTE: the 
owner-occupied housing market is modeled as a price-forma-
tion market (Farooq 2011), while rental housing is modeled as 
a price-taker market. This clear distinction between the opera-
tionalization of the two markets in ILUTE enables it to capture 
the individual market dynamics while ensuring the interactions 
between them through the loose coupling of the two. To our 
knowledge this is the first time that this distinction between 
the two markets has been implemented explicitly in an urban 
model. The next two subsections focus on the rental housing 
market in ILUTE, along with initial model results.
 Each year in ILUTE, households evaluate the deci-
sion to change their existing locations. If a household decides 
to move, it is then faced with the tenure decision of, for exam-
ple, whether to get active in the owner-occupied or rental hous-
ing market. This decision is based on probability distributions 
generated from the Canadian Census data for various income 
levels of the households (Giroux-Cook, 2010). Households 
that decide to rent a dwelling start the search process for a po-
tential dwelling. In the current implementation, all the active 
dwellings in the market are available for consideration to all the 
active households. The other option that could have been used 
was to randomly choose the choice set for each renter. Elgar et 
al. (2011) investigated the choice set generation process for a 
firm’s location choice models and suggested that in forecast-
ing mode, the model considering all the options outperformed 
the choice set generation process in which a subset of choices 
was randomly chosen. They also suggested anchor points based 
choice set generation processes in the spatial context. With the 
availability of better datasets, a more realistic choice set genera-
tion process that is inspired by an anchor point-based approach 
can be developed for renting households.
 Rents for the active dwellings are determined using 
the rent-setting model, developed using average rent data from 
the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), 
supplemented by Canadian Census data. In the clearing pro-
cess, the problem is reduced to finding a maximum weighted 
bipartite graph, using the formulation and solution suggested 
in Sections 2 and 3. In the current version, the income levels 
of the households determine the weight on the edges. Hence, 
these weights are unidirectional and represent the assumption 
that landlords give the dwelling to the interested household 
with the highest income. However, Giroux-Cook (2010) rec-
ommends that a random utility-based model be developed that 
incorporates the preferences of the households. Moreover, it is 
pointed out that landlords often screen out potential renters 
due to discrimination against race, gender, class, etc. Giroux-
Cook suggests that the utility function of the landlord that 
expresses this behavior should also be included in the weight 
of the edges. In terms of our formulation, the edges will then 
correspond to bidirectional weights.
4.6 Rental housing market simulation results
For the validation of the rental market, small samples of 10,000 
and 50,000 households were microsimulated from 1986 to 
2006, and their evolutions were compared with historical data. 
Table 3 compares the average rental prices in 2001 with cen-
sus data. Currently the prices forecasted by ILUTE are lower 
and have lesser variance compared to the census. This is due to 
the fact that the current rent model operational in ILUTE, is 
insensitive to neighborhood characteristics, market conditions, 
and accessibility. We plan to replace it with a more detailed 
model as soon as we have access to better datasets.
Table 3. Average rents in 2001
ILUTE Census
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev.
Total 610.19 241.13 848.03 392.42
Figure 8 presents the comparison between the spatial distribu-
tion of renter households in ILUTE and the 2001 census. The 
spatial trend produced by ILUTE generally seems to match 
the historical pattern, with a few exceptions, particularly in the 
southwest (Hamilton region). Note that a more detailed dis-
cussion of the results from the operationalized rental market in 
ILUTE can be found in Giroux-Cook (2010).
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Figure 8. Spatial distribution of renter households in 2001: Census-
ILUTE (darker shades represent higher densities)
5 concluding remarks and future direction
In the literature, few examples can be found on microsimu-
lation modeling of specific price-taker markets, for instance: 
Waddell et al. (2003) presented a housing market model while 
Leombruni and Richiardi (2011) proposed a microsimulation 
labor market model. However in this paper, taking advantage 
of the similarities among these markets, we presented a single 
generic microsimulation framework for modeling the urban 
price-taker markets that can we used to model a wide range 
of markets. Core concepts from graph theory were used to 
abstract the market as a bipartite weighted graph. Commonly 
used algorithm was first explored for its appropriateness in the 
context of large-scale microsimulation of urban systems. Based 
on which, an efficient algorithm was then developed to find 
the solution for the market-clearing problem. 
 We applied the proposed framework to marriage and 
rental housing markets within the ILUTE modeling system. 
Due to unavailability of data on actual marriages, the valida-
tion of the results produced by the implemented marriage 
markets was performed using indirect means. A close match 
was found between the evolved simulation population and 
census. The choice set generation process and utility function 
need to be revisited in the marriage market. Clear distinction 
was made between rental owner-occupied markets. In the case 
of the owner-occupied market, the endogenous formation of 
price is a dominant characteristic, while in case of the rental 
market, rent levels are very much predetermined. We thus 
modeled the rental market as a price-taker market. In the case 
of the rental market, the comparison between the simulation 
results and historical data demonstrated that the current rental 
model requires further modifications to improve the accuracy 
of its results. The three primary areas of improvement needed 
are (a) estimates of the number of households getting active in 
the rental market, (b) estimates of dwelling asking rents, and 
(c) choice set generation for the renters.
 The framework developed here is very rich in term 
of representing agents’ behavior and market characteristics—
agents heterogeneity, differences in choice set formation pro-
cess, market segments, and supply and demand shocks are 
some of the key features that can be represented by this frame-
work. At the same time, it is highly efficient and scalable in 
terms of microsimulation operationalization of various urban 
markets that display price-taker behavior by consumers. The 
proposed implementation has an order of complexity that is a 
linear function of the number of active consumers or produc-
ers (depending on whichever is greater) in the market. Using 
the same framework, we are in the process of operationalizing 
the labor force market within ILUTE. Moreover, as a future 
research direction, we intend to further extend the application 
of the proposed framework in areas like urban freight transpor-
tation and air travel.
 A full-scale microsimulation of the marriage market 
for the GTHA requires dealing with approximately 100,000 
agents (including all active males and females). Within an ur-
ban microsimulation system such as ILUTE, this results in 
very high memory and computational requirements (as is com-
monly the case in any large-scale microsimulation of urban sys-
tems). To overcome such challenges, as an ongoing research, we 
are exploring efficient use of readily available multi-core 64-bit 
computer architecture, by exploiting access to larger memories 
and speedup by parallelization. Because of the complex nature 
of interactions among agents, the parallelization of any type of 
market is nontrivial, which requires careful partitioning of the 
problem, resolving various dependencies and avoiding dead-
locks. In the future, we plan to develop specialized algorithms 
and data structures that are capable of handling this.
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